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I. Introduction 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 
the world governing body for football, was publicly scorned in the 
summer of 2015 when the rampant corruption of the international 
association was unveiled as a result of the indictments of several top 
FIFA officials by the U.S. Department of Justice.1  In May of that 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law.  Articles Editor, North 
Carolina Journal of International Law. 
 1 FIFA Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066 [https://perma.cc/CL6U-
4NE6] [hereinafter FIFA Corruption Crisis].  The sport referenced here as football is 
called soccer in the United States.  FIFA, the world governing body for football, is based 
in Zurich, Switzerland and is formally registered as a non-profit association governed by 
Swiss law.  Henrik Böhme, FIFA’s Controversial Business Model, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
2 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
year, at the request of U.S. authorities, the Swiss police descended 
upon a swanky Zurich hotel to arrest seven FIFA executives.2  
Between May and December of 2015, more than thirty FIFA 
officials and associates were indicted by the U.S. Department of 
Justice for charges of corruption, including racketeering, wire fraud 
conspiracies, money laundering conspiracies, and bribery.3  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating potential 
FIFA corruption three years before the 2015 indictments in response 
to the suspect bidding process for the Russia 2018 and the Qatar 
2022 World Cups, only to later widen the investigation to include 
the past twenty years of FIFA dealings.4  In issuing indictments 
stemming from FIFA leaders’ corrupt practices, U.S. authorities 
alleged in part that U.S. banks were involved in the money transfers 
tainted by the misconduct of FIFA officials.5  Alongside the ongoing 
FBI inquiry into FIFA corruption, the Swiss Attorney General 
launched a separate criminal investigation.6 
FIFA is the governing body responsible for running 
international football, organizing the World Cup, and generating 
“billions of dollars in revenue from corporate sponsors, 
broadcasting rights[,] and merchandising.”7  As such, the corruption 
of their vast international affairs has had and will continue to have 
widespread consequences, ranging from criminal prosecutions of 
top executives and FIFA associates to potentially indefinite internal 
FIFA bans of involved individuals.8  Already, former FIFA 
President Sepp Blatter and Union of European Football Association 
(UEFA) President Michel Platini have been “found guilty of 
breaches surrounding a £1.3m ($2m) ‘disloyal payment’ made to 
Platini in 2011,” and FIFA has openly expressed that Blatter and 
 
(May 27, 2015), https://www.dw.com/en/fifas-controversial-business-model/a-18479441 
[https://perma.cc/2A6H-5NNN]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.  See also Press Release, United States Dep’t of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials & 
Five Corp. Execs. Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy Corruption (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-
and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and 
[https://perma.cc/8PD8-WBBJ] [hereinafter Nine FIFA Officials]. 
 4 FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 1. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id.  
 8 Id. 
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Platini “demonstrated an ‘abusive execution’ of their positions.”9  
Independent of the criminal charges, FIFA internally punished 
Blatter and Platini with the decision by the FIFA Ethics Committee 
to ban both leaders from all football-related activities for eight 
years.10  The ongoing Swiss and U.S. criminal investigations and the 
growing number of FIFA officials and associates proven guilty of 
corrupt practices “cast doubt over the transparency and honesty for 
the process of allocating World Cup tournaments, electing 
[officials], and the administration of funds . . . .”11  In spite of the 
doubts and pressures from external sources, FIFA has not given up 
the fight for its credibility as a capable governing body for the 
world’s most popular sport.12  
Further motivated by the ongoing criminal cases, FIFA has 
moved forward with reform efforts that aim to combat corruption.13  
FIFA is precariously positioned for further corruption to occur in 
the future due to the following considerations: (1) FIFA reform is 
predominantly guided by internal mechanisms for change within the 
organization; (2) external governmental bodies have minimal 
opportunities for review of FIFA practices; and (3) FIFA 
disciplinary measures have limited negative consequences for FIFA 
rule violations.14  Nevertheless, FIFA’s 2018 reforms of the FIFA 
Code of Ethics represent a strong initial attack on corruption.15  
Moving forward, however, FIFA reform efforts should focus on 
building an internal culture of compliance, integrity, and public 
transparency.  
This Note will proceed in six parts.  Part I will briefly explain 
the Qatar controversy over the bidding process to host the 2022 
World Cup and how FIFA responded internally to the allegations of 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 1. 
 12 See generally Amendments to the FIFA Statutes and Regulations, FIFA (July 27, 
2018), https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/1645-amendments-to-the-fifa-statutes-
and-the-regulations-governing-the-applicati.pdf?cloudid=ncxm7twuakafdkf4yijl  
[https://perma.cc/T92E-PM2G] [hereinafter Amendments]. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See generally id. (amendments to FIFA regulations); FIFA Statutes, infra note 32 
(laying out the governance structure of FIFA); FIFA Disciplinary Code, infra note 49 
(enumerating the responsibilities of the Disciplinary Committee); FIFA Code of Ethics, 
infra note 58 (outlining the powers of the FIFA Ethics Committee). 
 15 Id. 
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corruption.  Part II will describe FIFA’s governance structure and 
the duties allocated to each FIFA body.  Part III will summarize the 
amendments to the FIFA Code of Ethics that are most closely aimed 
at combatting corruption within FIFA.  Part IV will present a 
sampling of recent recommendations for FIFA reform described in 
other law journals, and Part V will respond directly to the strengths 
and shortcomings of the commentators’ recommendations in light 
of FIFA’s recent reform efforts.  Part VI will then recommend 
furthering FIFA reform through public transparency and taking 
steps toward creating an anti-corruption culture within FIFA. 
II. The Qatar Controversy and FIFA’s Response 
FIFA’s reputation has been tainted by corruption for decades.16  
Although the FIFA Ethics Committee has historically monitored 
and resolved many specific instances of corruption, the most recent 
claims of bribery and corruption that swirled around the bidding 
process to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cup competitions have not 
been so easily brushed away by FIFA governance.17  In December 
2010, the final vote for the hosting rights to the 2022 World Cup 
resulted in eight votes cast for the United States and fourteen votes 
cast for Qatar.18  In the wake of bribery and corruption claims prior 
to, during, and after the vote, a Qatar victory to host the 2022 World 
Cup added fuel to an already raging wildfire of controversy.  The 
questionable nature of a Qatar victory was especially enflamed by 
the lack of logic in the choice of Qatar as host nation, considering 
the obstacles of weather conditions, suspected human rights 
violations, and a lack of existing football facilities.19  Although 
sparked by the controversial bid for Qatar, the United States and 
Swiss inquiries were not the only investigative efforts to sniff out 
misconduct.20  
In light of the controversy over the Qatar victory, FIFA moved 
 
 16 See Jack Rollin, The FIFA Corruption Scandal, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 
17, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/FIFA-Corruption-Scandal-The-2076091 
[https://perma.cc/T7PY-HU7V]. 
 17 See Kate Youd, Comment, The Winter’s Tale of Corruption: The 2022 FIFA 
World Cup in Qatar the Impending Shift to Winter, and Potential Legal Actions against 
FIFA, 35 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 171 (2014). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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forward with its own internal investigation of the suspect bidding 
process.21  On November 13, 2014, the investigatory chamber for 
the FIFA Ethics Committee reviewed the relevant bidding and 
award process in light of the FIFA Code of Ethics and other FIFA 
rules and regulations.22  The investigatory chamber prepared its 
“Report on the Inquiry into the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup Bidding 
Process,” and in response, the chairman of the adjudicatory chamber 
issued an accompanying statement.23  The statement’s cover letter 
stressed the concern to “strike a balance between the public’s – 
legitimate – demand for transparency with regard to the occurrences 
related to the relevant World Cup bidding and award process and 
the legal framework [of] the Ethics Committee[’s]” operations, 
particularly the provisions on confidentiality in the FIFA Code of 
Ethics that protects the integrity of information disclosed during 
Ethics proceedings.24  The report was divided into three relevant 
sections: (1) the bidding process; (2) personalized information on 
individuals and bidders (with some restrictions); and (3) 
recommendations.25  In addition to numerous recommendations to 
reform the World Cup bidding process for future host selections, on 
November 18, 2014, then chairman of the adjudicatory chamber of 
the FIFA Ethics Committee, Hans-Joachim Eckert, 
“recommend[ed] to the FIFA President – in line with the FIFA Code 
of Ethics – that a criminal complaint be lodged with the Office of 
 
 21 See generally Press Release, Hans Joachim Eckert, Statement of the Chairman of 
the Adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee on the Report on the Inquiry 
into the 2018/2020 FIFA World Cup™Bidding Process prepared by the Investigatory 
Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://imgresources.fifa.com/image/upload/oixdbzuh94ae4p2w41lomm/document/affed
eration/footballgovernance/02/47/41/75/statementchairmanadjcheckert_neutral.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KK75-WY93] [hereinafter Eckert Statement]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  The FIFA Ethics Committee is one of three judicial bodies of FIFA, and it is 
further subdivided into an investigatory chamber, which leads the investigation of alleged 
misconduct, and an adjudicatory chamber, which follows an adjudicatory process to 
formally decide the issue and pronounce punishments when necessary.  See infra Part IIB2. 
 24 Cover Letter to Eckert Statement, FIFA, at 2 (Nov. 13, 2014), 
httpss://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/47/41/88/st
atementcoverletter_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXR4-28UL] [hereinafter Eckert Cover 
Letter]. 
 25 Ethics Committee Milestones (2012-2018), FIFA, at 7 (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/ethics-committee-milestones-2012-2016-
2741972.pdf?cloudid=flai7jvu5ah88alhscjd [https://perma.cc/6HWD-264Z] [hereinafter 
Milestones]. 
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the Attorney General of Switzerland in Berne.”26  
Concurrent with the Swiss criminal investigation, the U.S. 
Department of Justice proceeded with its independent investigation, 
resulting in the indictment of more than thirty FIFA officials and 
associates by the U.S. Department of Justice in late 2015 for charges 
of corruption, including racketeering, wire fraud, money 
laundering, and bribery.27  Although initially an investigation into 
the bidding process resulting in the Qatar victory to host the 2022 
World Cup, the FBI later widened the investigation to include the 
last several decades of corrupt FIFA dealings.28  In response to the 
facts presented by the U.S. investigation and on the basis of 
inquiries of the investigatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics 
Committee, the chairman of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA 
Ethics Committee implemented bans against numerous individuals 
involved in the corruption from carrying out any football-related 
activities at the national and international levels.29  For example, 
FIFA leaders Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini were under 
investigation by the investigatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics 
Committee for a multi-million dollar payment from FIFA to Platini 
that occurred back in February 2011.30  As a result of the FIFA 
internal investigation, on December 21, 2015, Blatter and Platini 
were officially banned from all national and international football-
related activities for eight years.31  
III. FIFA Organization and Duties 
A. FIFA Governing Bodies  
According to the most recent April 2015 update to the FIFA 
Statutes, FIFA governance is organized into separate governing 
bodies: the FIFA Congress (the legislative body), the FIFA 
Executive Committee (the executive body), the general secretariat 
(the administrative body), and other standing or ad hoc committees 
that provide advice and assistance to the FIFA Executive 
 
 26 Id. 
 27 Nine FIFA Officials, supra note 3.  See also FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 
1. 
 28 FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 1. 
 29 Milestones, supra note 25, at 10–14. 
 30 Id. at 13. 
 31 Id. at 14. 
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Committee in the fulfillment of its duties.32  
1. FIFA Congress 
The FIFA Congress “is responsible for adopting and amending 
the [FIFA] Statutes, the Regulations Governing the Application of 
the Statutes and the Standing Orders of the Congress.”33  In order to 
validate a vote to amend the FIFA Statutes, an absolute majority 
quorum of FIFA Members eligible to vote must be present, and if 
the proposal to adopt or amend the FIFA Statutes is approved by 
three-quarters or more of the eligible Members, then the proposal 
will be adopted by the FIFA Congress.34  A simple majority of valid 
votes is all that is required to adopt or amend the Regulations 
Governing the Application of the Statutes and the Standing Orders 
of Congress.35  All elections of FIFA officials are conducted by 
secret ballot at a session of the FIFA Congress.36  
2. FIFA Executive Committee 
The FIFA Executive Committee is comprised of twenty-five 
members, including the President (elected by the FIFA Congress), 
eight vice-presidents (elected by the Confederations and then 
installed by the FIFA Congress), one female member (elected by the 
FIFA Congress), and fifteen other members (elected by the 
Confederations and installed by the FIFA Congress).37  The six 
Confederations under the umbrella of FIFA with the power to elect 
members of the FIFA Executive Committee are widely known by 
their acronyms: CONMEBOL, AFC, UEFA, CAF, CONCACAF, 
and OFC.38  
 
 32 FIFA, FIFA STATUTES: APRIL 2015 EDITION 20 (2015), 
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/58/14/48/2015fifastatut
esen_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGM5-WX7P] [hereinafter FIFA Statutes]. 
 33 Id. at 25. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 24, 26. 
 37 Id. at 28. 
 38 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 29. “Members that belong to the same continent 
have formed the following Confederations, which are recognised by FIFA: a) 
Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol – CONMEBOL b) Asian Football Confederation 
– AFC c) Union des associations européennes de football – UEFA d) Confédération 
Africaine de Football – CAF e) Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean 
Association Football – CONCACAF f) Oceania Football Confederation – OFC.”  Id. at 
8 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
The FIFA Executive Committee is responsible for all decision-
making that does not fall “within the sphere of responsibility of the 
[FIFA] Congress or are not reserved for other bodies by law or 
under [the] Statutes.”39  One of the enumerated responsibilities of 
the FIFA Executive Committee is the appointment of the “place and 
dates of the final competitions of FIFA tournaments and the number 
of teams taking part from each Confederation,” with the exception 
of the decisions regarding the host country of the World Cup.40  The 
President is the legal representative of FIFA with three primary 
responsibilities: (1) “implementing the decisions passed by the 
Congress and the Executive Committee through the general 
secretariat;” (2) “supervising the work of the general secretariat;” 
and (3) maintaining “relations between FIFA and the 
Confederations Members, political bodies and international 
organizations.”41  
3. FIFA Standing Committees 
Of the twenty-six standing committees, the most pertinent are 
the Finance Committee, the Audit and Compliance Committee, the 
Legal Committee, and the Associations Committee.  The Finance 
Committee monitors FIFA’s financial management, advises the 
Executive Committee on financial matters, and analyzes the budget 
and financial statements that are submitted to the Executive 
Committee for approval.42  The Audit and Compliance Committee 
is responsible for “ensur[ing] the completeness and reliability of the 
financial accounting and reviewing the financial statements, the 
consolidated financial statement and the external auditor’s report.”43  
The Legal Committee analyzes “basic legal issues relating to 
football and the evolution of the Statutes and regulations of FIFA, 
the Confederations and Members.”44  The Associations Committee 
oversees the “relations between FIFA and its Members as well as 
 
17. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 30. 
 41 Id. at 31.  The general secretariat performs the administrative work of FIFA under 
the guidance and direction of the Secretary General, the chief executive of the general 
secretariat.  Id. at 51. 
 42 Id. at 35. 
 43 Id. 
 44 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 41. 
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the Members’ compliance with the FIFA Statutes and draw[s] up 
proposals for optimum cooperation.”45  
B. FIFA Judicial Governance  
In addition to the above governing bodies, FIFA has three 
judicial bodies: (1) the Disciplinary Committee; (2) the Ethics 
Committee; and (3) the Appeal Committee.46  The FIFA 
Disciplinary Code governs the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, and 
the FIFA Code of Ethics governs the FIFA Ethics Committee.47  The 
FIFA Appeal Committee is governed by both the FIFA Disciplinary 
Code and the FIFA Code of Ethics.48  
1. FIFA Disciplinary Committee 
The FIFA Disciplinary Committee has the authority to “sanction 
any breach of FIFA regulations which does not come under the 
jurisdiction of another body.”49  The object and purpose of the FIFA 
Disciplinary Code is to describe the infringements of FIFA rules, 
determine the resulting sanctions, regulate the organization and 
function of the decision-making bodies, and define the procedures 
for interacting with those bodies.50  The FIFA Disciplinary Code has 
broad scope of authority to regulate.51  The FIFA Disciplinary Code 
applies in every circumstance that involves any match or 
competition organized by FIFA, any breach of the statutory 
objectives of FIFA, especially in regard to forgery, corruption, and 
doping, and any breach of FIFA regulations that are not the 
responsibility of another body.52  FIFA regulations include “the 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 43. 
 47 Id. at 44–45. 
 48 Id. at 45. 
 49 FIFA Disciplinary Code, FIFA, at 10 (May 9, 2017), 
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-disciplinary-code-
500276.pdf?cloudid=koyeb3cvhxnwy9yz4aa6 [https://perma.cc/QS9J-EW6C] 
[hereinafter FIFA Disciplinary Code]. “The Disciplinary Committee is responsible for: a) 
sanctioning serious infringements which have escaped the match officials’ attention; b) 
rectifying obvious errors in the referee’s disciplinary decisions; c) extending the duration 
of a match suspension incurred automatically by an expulsion; d) pronouncing additional 
sanctions, such as a fine.”  Id. at 40 (citation omitted). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 Id. at 10–11. 
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statutes, regulations, directives and circulars of FIFA as well as the 
Laws of the Game issued by the International Football Association 
Board.”53  Typical disciplinary measures include: a warning, a 
reprimand, a fine, a return of rewards, an expulsion, a forfeit, a ban 
from a stadium, a ban on taking part in any football-related activity, 
and others of similar consequence.54  With respect to corruption, the 
FIFA Disciplinary Code mandates the following: 
 
Anyone who offers, promises or grants an unjustified advantage 
to a body of FIFA, a match official, a player or an official on 
behalf of himself or a third party in an attempt to incite it or him 
to violate the regulations of FIFA will be sanctioned: 
a) with a fine of at least CHF 10,000, 
b) with a ban on taking part in any football-related 
activity, and 
c) with a ban on entering any stadium.55  
 
Additionally, “[p]assive corruption (soliciting, being promised 
or accepting an unjustified advantage) will be sanctioned in the 
same manner[,] [and] in serious cases and in the case of repetition, 
sanction 1b) may be pronounced for life.”56  Furthermore, all assets 
involved in committing the infringement will be confiscated and 
used for football development programs.57  
2. FIFA Ethics Committee 
The FIFA Ethics Committee is composed of an investigatory 
chamber and an adjudicatory chamber, and FIFA Ethics Committee 
proceedings include first an investigation and then an adjudicatory 
process.58  The FIFA Ethics Committee has the authority to 
pronounce sanctions enumerated in the FIFA Code of Ethics, the 
 
 53 Id. at 12. 
 54 Id. at 14.  Fines may be issued in Swiss francs (CHF) or U.S. dollars (USD) and 
may be no less than CHF 200 and no more than CHF 1,000,000.  Id. at 15. 
 55 FIFA Disciplinary Code, supra note 49, at 33. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 FIFA Code of Ethics, FIFA, at 10 (June 10, 2018), 
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-code-of-ethics-2018-version-takes-effect-
12-08-18.pdf?cloudid=uemlkcy8wwdtlll6sy3j [https://perma.cc/D5LF-AVQA] 
[hereinafter FIFA Code of Ethics]. 
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FIFA Disciplinary Code, or the FIFA Statutes.59  The FIFA Code of 
Ethics applies to “any conduct . . . that damages the integrity and 
reputation of football and in particular to illegal, immoral and 
unethical behavior of . . . all officials and players as well as match 
agents and intermediaries.”60  Persons bound by the FIFA Code of 
Ethics may be punished for a breach of the Code or any other FIFA 
rule or regulation with one or more of the following sanctions: a 
warning, a reprimand, compliance training, a return of awards, a 
fine, social work, a match suspension, a ban from dressing rooms 
and/or the substitutes’ bench, a ban on entering the stadium, or a 
ban on taking part in any football-related activity.61  The FIFA Code 
of Ethics covers such areas of misconduct as commission, forgery 
and falsification, abuse of position, bribery, and misappropriation 
of funds.62  Additionally, a “Duty to Report” is built into the FIFA 
Code of Ethics such that persons bound by the Code who become 
aware of infringements are required to directly inform the 
investigatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee or risk a fine 
of at least CHF 10,000 and a ban from taking part in any football-
related activity for a maximum of two years.63  
3. FIFA Appeal Committee 
The purpose of the FIFA Appeal Committee is to decide 
“appeals against any of the Disciplinary Committee’s decisions that 
FIFA regulations do not declare as final or referable to another 
body.”64  The FIFA Appeal Committee may hear appropriate 
appeals of decisions of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics 
Committee that relate to infringements concerning the manipulation 
of football matches or competitions.65  
C. Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
The FIFA Statutes authorize the independent Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), headquartered in Lausanne, 
Switzerland, to “resolve disputes between FIFA, Members, 
 
 59 Id. at 11. 
 60 Id. at 9. 
 61 Id. at 11. 
 62 Id. at 19–23. 
 63 Id. at 16. 
 64 FIFA Disciplinary Code, supra note 49, at 41. 
 65 FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58, at 51. 
12 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
Confederations, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials, intermediaries 
and licensed match agents.”66  The Confederations, Members, 
Leagues and their members and affiliates, in addition to 
intermediaries and licensed match agents, are also obligated by the 
FIFA Statutes to recognize CAS as an independent judicial 
authority and to comply with CAS decisions.67  
CAS serves as the independent, international court of last resort 
for most sports matters.68  However, FIFA “[r]ecourse may only be 
made to CAS after all other internal channels have been 
exhausted.”69  CAS proceedings are governed by the CAS Code of 
Sports-Related Arbitration, but in deciding a case, CAS will 
primarily apply the relevant FIFA regulations, and when necessary, 
Swiss law.70  With few exceptions, final decisions passed by FIFA’s 
legal bodies or decisions passed by Confederations, Members, or 
Leagues may be appealed to CAS within 21 days of notification of 
the final decision in question.71  Apart from CAS, “[r]ecourse to 
ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for 
in the FIFA regulations[, and] [r]ecourse to ordinary courts of law 
for all types of provisional measures is also prohibited.”72  In the 
large majority of circumstances, in the absence of a FIFA regulation 
or binding legal provision that allows or stipulates recourse to an 
ordinary court of law, disputes will be handled by an independent 
and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognized by FIFA, 
Confederation rules, or by CAS.73  
IV. FIFA 2018 Reforms 
In the interest of “safeguard[ing] the integrity and reputation of 
football worldwide . . . [and] protect[ing] the image of football from 
 
 66 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 47. 
 67 Id. at 49. 
 68 See History of the CAS, TAS/CAS, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-
information/history-of-the-cas.html [https://perma.cc/NPS3-89JG]. 
 69 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 47. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. (“CAS . . . does not deal with appeals rising from: (a) violations of the Laws of 
the Game; (b) suspensions of up to four matches or up to three months (with the exception 
of doping decisions); (c) decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly 
constituted arbitration tribunal recognized under the rules of an Association or 
Confederation may be made.”). 
 72 Id. at 49. 
 73 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 49. 
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jeopardy or harm as a result of immoral or unethical methods and 
practices,” FIFA implemented reform measures in the aftermath of 
the 2015 controversies.74  On June 13, 2018, the sixty-eighth FIFA 
Congress approved amendments to the FIFA Statutes that came into 
effect August 12, 2018.75  In addition to the amended FIFA Statutes, 
the FIFA Congress reviewed the 2012 FIFA Code of Ethics, through 
the collaborative effort of the chairpersons and members of the 
investigatory and adjudicatory chambers of the FIFA Ethics 
Committee and representatives of the Confederations, which 
resulted in the updated 2018 version of the FIFA Code of Ethics – 
approved by the FIFA Council on June 10, 2018 and admitted into 
force on August 12, 2018.76  With the intention of “enabl[ing] the 
football world to have a standardised and generally recognised 
common agreement as to the conduct that is to be considered 
inappropriate by football officials,” FIFA mandated that its member 
associations and confederations include the updated provisions of 
the 2018 FIFA Code of Ethics in their respective applicable 
regulations.77  
Although there were many amendments to the FIFA Code of 
Ethics, the following updates most directly combat the internal 
corruption that surfaced in 2015: (1) the FIFA Code of Ethics now 
empowers the FIFA Ethics Committee to investigate and judge the 
conduct of all persons bound by the FIFA Code of Ethics; (2) the 
amendments further specify the degree of sanctions and add a new 
disciplinary measure in the form of compliance training; and (3) the 
updated Code additionally provides that most of the FIFA Ethics 
Committee decisions may be appealed directly before the CAS.78 
The revisions to the FIFA Code of Ethics now 
 
provide[] for an exclusive competence of the Ethics Committee to 
investigate and judge the conduct of all persons bound by the 
Code of Ethics where such conduct: [(1)] [h]as been committed 
by an individual who was elected, appointed or assigned by FIFA 
to exercise a function; [(2)] [d]irectly concerns their FIFA-related 
duties or responsibilities; or [(3)] [i]s related to the use of FIFA 
 
 74 Amendments, supra note 12. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
14 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
funds.79  
 
If the concerned conduct falls outside of the above designated 
scenarios, the member associations of FIFA and the Confederations, 
depending on the scope of the relevant conduct, may have the 
capability to lead their own investigations and render judgments on 
the matter.80  However, if the member association or the 
Confederation fails to act within three months from the time that the 
FIFA Ethics Committee receives notice of the matter, the FIFA 
Ethics Committee reserves the right to exert its authority.81  
In an effort to promote transparency and legal clarity in ethics 
proceedings, the FIFA Code of Ethics was amended to further 
specify the degree of sanctions, such that “[e]ach material article 
contains either a minimum or a maximum sanction, which is 
binding upon the Ethics Committee with the exception of cases with 
repeated breaches.”82  Additionally, the FIFA Code of Ethics now 
includes a new disciplinary measure, compliance training to be 
imposed at the discretion of the FIFA Ethics Committee, which is 
intended “to ensure that the football officials concerned understand 
and adhere to the applicable laws and regulations that apply to their 
roles.”83  Finally, rather than a requirement that the FIFA Ethics 
Committee decisions must first be appealed to the FIFA Appeal 
Committee, the updated FIFA Code of Ethics provides that “most 
of the decisions of the Ethics Committee may be appealed directly 
before CAS.”84  However, as mentioned in Part II(B), decisions of 
the FIFA Ethics Committee that specifically concern match 
manipulation will still first be appealed to the FIFA Appeal 
Committee, and then, where necessary, may be appealed to CAS.85  
V. Commentators’ Recommendations 
In concluding that FIFA has for some time needed internal 
reform in order to combat the corrupt practices of its individual 
members and member institutions, many commentators have 
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weighed in on the debate and have expressed their opinions on how 
to best go about the process of reform.86  
Ali Eghbal, a graduate of Southwestern Law School and 
currently a law clerk for the presiding judge of the Los Angeles 
County Juvenile Court, argues for the implementation of the policy 
behind the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) in order to 
curb the corruption in FIFA.87  “The Administrative Procedure Act 
successfully solved the separation of powers and transparency 
issues stemming from federal administrative agencies in the United 
States.”88  According to Eghbal’s recommendation, FIFA would 
benefit from mimicking various features of the APA, such as (1) the 
“organizationally independent” role of the “hearing examiner,” or 
the adjudicator who hands down decisions in regard to disputes; (2) 
the importance placed on public transparency; and most 
importantly, (3) the adjudicatory decision’s subjection to review in 
the federal court system.89  
In commenting on the “culture of corruption” within FIFA 
governance, Professor Bruce W. Bean of Michigan State University 
College of Law suggests that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 (FCPA) be amended to include FIFA on its list of international 
organizations subject to the provisions of the FCPA.90  The FCPA 
“criminalizes bribes paid to foreign officials, including officials of 
‘public international organizations.’”91  As such, if FIFA was 
included on the FCPA list of international organizations, “bribes 
paid to or extorted by FIFA officials would be subject to the 
provisions of the FCPA, and anyone with a connection to the United 
States paying such a bribe would be paying to an FCPA ‘foreign 
official’ and thus would be subject to the criminal provisions of the 
FCPA.”92  In a later essay, Professor Bean readdresses the 
 
 86 See, e.g., Ali Eghbal, Note, Enough Is Enough: FIFA Must Incorporate Principles 
from the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 to Combat Ongoing Executive Committee 
Corruption, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 385, 400 (2015) (arguing that the implementation of the 
policy behind the Administration Procedure Act of 1946 will help curb FIFA corruption). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 402–03. 
 90 Bruce W. Bean, An Interim Essay on FIFA’s World Cup of Corruption: The 
Desperate Need for International Corporate Governance Standards at FIFA, 22 ILSA J 
INT’L & COMP L 367, 391 (2016) [hereinafter Bean, An Interim Essay]. 
 91 Id. at 390. 
 92 Id. 
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continuing problem of FIFA corruption by recommending a short 
list of approaches to reform, including the following: (1) self-reform 
by FIFA; (2) Swiss government action; (3) pressure, including 
prosecutions, from host governments; (4) pressure from sponsors; 
(5) action by the international community through a convention; 
and/or (6) action from the United Nations or another 
intergovernmental organization.93  
In a note for the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal, 
then Senior Notes Editor Alexander Mandel, who currently 
practices as an associate with Greenberg Traurig in New York, 
recommended a “complete overhaul of [FIFA’s] current corporate 
structure” that would need to be set out in a series of long-term 
proposals and led by an independent board of directors.94  According 
to Mandel, the implementation of an independent board of directors 
“will help attack [FIFA’s] corruption by laying out specific tasks of 
the members and increasing the power that these executives have 
within the organization.”95  Mandel further concludes that true 
reformation will not occur within FIFA until there is “more 
accountability and more transparency amongst the entire 
organization.”96  
VI. Response to Commentators’ Proposals in Light of 
FIFA’s Reform Efforts 
In review of the above recommendations for FIFA reform, it is 
evident that FIFA has historically lacked public transparency as 
well as adequate measures for checks and balances within FIFA 
leadership and management.  However, a closer look at the FIFA 
rules and regulations, especially as they concern the most recent 
reforms to the FIFA Code of Ethics and the efforts of FIFA 
governance to create a new image of transparency, reveals strides in 
the right direction for FIFA in the war against internal corruption.97  
Granted, it will likely take many years of consistent effort for a 
 
 93 Bruce W. Bean, FIFA Is Corruption: What Is To Be Done?, 27 MICH. ST. INT’L L. 
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 94 Alexander Mandel, Note, Fixing Soccer: Changing FIFA’s Corporate 
Governance Structure in Response to the Current FIFA Corruption Scandal, 35 CARDOZO 
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culture of transparency and accountability to pervade an 
international organization with so far a reach as FIFA. 
At least one of the above recommendations has already been 
implemented to some degree by FIFA.98  In reference to Ali 
Eghbal’s Enough Is Enough, the suggested creation of an 
“organizationally independent” role for the “hearing examiner” in 
reflection of a feature of the APA seems practically moot when 
FIFA has a fully-formed and fully-functional Ethics Committee that 
serves as an independent body for purposes of investigating and 
adjudicating potential conduct violations, including corrupt 
practices.99  One potential way to improve upon the idea of a more 
“organizationally independent” role100 for the FIFA Ethics 
Committee is to amend the FIFA Statutes to provide that at least a 
select number of the members of the investigatory chamber and 
adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee include legal 
professionals with experience and familiarity with sports disputes, 
who are not otherwise already involved with FIFA, to fill non-
voting advisory positions.101  As such, the FIFA Code of Ethics 
should be amended to allow for the existence of the proposed third-
party advisory positions.102  
Other commentary that stresses the external regulation of FIFA 
as the cure-all for corruption overlooks the unique nature of sports 
law in the context of corporate corruption.  For example, Ali 
Eghbal’s suggestion – to implement a stronger checks and balances 
 
 98 See generally Independent Ethics Committee, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/who-we-are/committees/committee/1882034/ [https://perma.cc/4UZL-JWTM]. 
 99 See FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58, at 26 (“The members of the Ethics 
Committee shall manage their investigations and proceedings and render their decisions 
entirely independently and shall avoid any third-party influence.  The members of the 
Ethics Committee and their immediate family members shall not belong to any other 
judicial body within FIFA, to the FIFA Council or to any standing committee of FIFA.  
The members of the Ethics Committee shall not belong to any other FIFA bodies.”). 
 100 Eghbal, supra note 86, at 402–03. 
 101 In recent history, FIFA has shown a willingness to reform the organizational 
independence of the Ethics Committee.  In 2013, FIFA took ultimately unsuccessful steps 
toward hiring independent executives, including German Judge Hans-Joachim Eckert as 
head of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee, former United States 
Attorney Michael Garcia as head of the FIFA Ethics Committee’s investigatory chamber, 
and additional independent executives in the roles of Chief Financial Officer and the heads 
of the Governance and Audit & Compliance Committees.  Bean, FIFA is Corruption, 
supra note 93, at 249. 
 102 FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58. 
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protocol in regard to judicial review of FIFA conduct by subjecting 
FIFA adjudicatory decisions to review in the federal court system103 
– has one major flaw.  The resulting system would give local courts, 
with less than adequate expertise in the delicacies of sports-related 
violations, the ultimate decision-making power on such matters.104  
Additionally, allowing national courts to review FIFA adjudicatory 
decisions would lead to inconsistent precedent across jurisdictional 
lines.105  A more tenable solution would be to increase the appellate 
role of CAS as a final review of FIFA adjudicatory decisions, which 
has recently been implemented by the updated 2018 FIFA Code of 
Ethics.106  The specific reform to the 2018 FIFA Code of Ethics 
provides that “most of the decisions of the Ethics Committee may 
[now] be appealed directly before CAS.”107  Similar difficulties 
stemming from a lack of expertise in matters of sports law arise with 
regard to Alexander Mandel’s call to establish an entirely 
independent board of directors.108   
Lastly, Professor Bruce W. Bean’s suggestion to amend the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) to include FIFA on 
its list of international organizations subject to the provisions of the 
FCPA, which “criminalizes bribes paid to foreign officials, 
including officials of ‘public international organizations,’”109 is 
unlikely to resolve FIFA corruption with so simple a solution.  In 
particular, although FIFA’s addition to the FCPA list may reduce 
some corrupt practices, any benefit gained in the battle against FIFA 
corruption would not extend beyond transactions with the United 
States,110 so this recommendation is inherently limited in its 
implementation.  Professor Bean’s later recommendations of Swiss 
government action, pressure from host governments and sponsors, 
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REV. 269, 292 (2010). 
 105 See id. 
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and action by the international community,111 may have some 
success in holding FIFA and its officials accountable for corrupt 
activities that have already occurred, but, without internal change, 
that external pressure will likely fail to prevent further corruption.112  
FIFA has implemented reform measures in an effort to combat 
corruption.113  However, FIFA is still susceptible to further 
corruption due to its own predominant control over internal reform, 
limitations for external review of its practices, and limited 
consequences for rule violations.114  Although organized under 
Swiss law, FIFA is an international association that is almost 
completely accountable to itself,115 which means there is inherent 
potential for corruption to resurface even in the face of reform.  
Currently, most external accountability to FIFA comes from CAS, 
which works within FIFA rules and Swiss law, and only steps in as 
an appellate force deciding issues after the fact, rather than 
combatting corruption before it occurs.116  Additionally, the 
limitation of few available aggressive disciplinary measures – most 
aggressive being the ban from all football-related activity and, on 
the other end of the spectrum, social work or the mild new addition 
of compliance training117 – does not bode well in favor of 
discouraging corrupt behavior by FIFA officials.  
VII. Further Recommendations for FIFA Reform 
An alternative, or at the very least a complement, to increasing 
external review of FIFA affairs is an internal reform effort by FIFA 
leadership to increase public transparency and promote an anti-
corruption culture.  Corporate transparency and reporting generally 
represents “a contentious area of anti-corruption work” for 
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multinational corporations because “[t]ransparency can jeopardize 
a company’s competitive position where much of its action and 
strategy must be done away from the eyes of its competitors.”118  
However, FIFA has been heralded as “the perfect global 
monopoly”,119 which creates an opportunity for FIFA, an 
unchallenged international sports association powerhouse, to set a 
revolutionary industry standard of “unilateral transparency.”120  
One way that FIFA could move toward unilateral transparency 
is to focus on “corporate social reporting.”121  Social reporting 
involves the disclosure of the processes that corporations use to 
manage corporate social responsibility issues and their performance 
on these matters, and “[w]ith this information, stakeholders . . . can 
seek to hold corporations accountable and pressure them to improve 
performance if needed.”122  If FIFA were to implement social 
reporting practices intended to demystify FIFA affairs with 
voluntary reports on the behind-the-scenes operations of the 
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international football association, continuous pressure from the 
fans, players, middle management, and the remaining public may 
be just enough to keep a lid on FIFA corruption.123  However, in 
order for social reporting practices to be effective, FIFA must 
commit to producing quality social reports with special emphasis 
placed on curbing such concerns as “incompleteness of information 
in the reports, . . . lack of consistency from year to year, [and] the 
inability to compare social report data” with other comparable 
international entities.124  Furthermore, public transparency must be 
paired with the supporting influence of an anti-corruption culture 
within FIFA governance.  
Recasting FIFA’s internal affairs with a new anti-corruption 
culture will be no easy feat.  “Establishing a good corporate culture 
takes thoughtful planning and thorough implementation of sound 
policies and procedures, but fixing a broken corporate culture is 
hard and painful, and regaining a lost reputation for integrity is 
virtually impossible.”125  
Rather than move forward with a complete upheaval of the FIFA 
executive governance structure, this Note, as a start, recommends 
that FIFA governance should embrace a mission of “high 
performance, high integrity, and sound risk management,” as 
recommended by Ben W. Heineman Jr., former General Counsel for 
the major U.S. corporation General Electric, in his book The Inside 
Counsel Revolution.126  Heineman’s “high performance, high 
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integrity, sound risk management” model was partly intended as a 
tool to combat the corruption that had pervaded corporate culture in 
the United States for decades, only to come to light with very public 
scandals in the early 2000s.127  FIFA is both a governing body and 
a business, and as such, FIFA leadership and employees are tempted 
by the earning potential from shortcuts and corrupt practices in 
much the same way that business leaders are tempted toward 
misconduct in corporate practices.128  However, a strong and 
consistent model of integrity and ethical practices encouraged by 
FIFA leadership, as well as a thorough cleansing of FIFA 
governance by disassociating the individuals with a tainted 
reputation for corruption, will positively impact the internal culture 
within FIFA.129  
Implementing a “high integrity”130 mission for the international 
football association should begin with taking steps toward 
strengthening areas of FIFA that are vulnerable to employee and 
governance misconduct.131  In an effort to ensure that both 
governing officers and employees follow the “high integrity”132 
mission, it is vital that all FIFA-affiliated personnel are “informed, 
responsive and ethical.”133  FIFA “should promote and reward good 
behavior, develop ethical statements and codes of conduct, . . . take 
swift action to punish bad behavior[, and] . . .  develop controls that 
will prevent, or at least expose, bad conduct.”134  In light of FIFA 
reform efforts already underway, including the FIFA Code of 
Ethics’ incorporation of required compliance training as a potential 
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disciplinary measure135 and the existing “Duty to Report” described 
in the FIFA Code of Ethics,136  FIFA has made strides in the right 
direction toward recasting the FIFA culture as one focused on 
preventing corruption.  But change does not happen overnight.  If 
FIFA has any true chance of ridding international football of 
corruption, a commitment to rooting out corruption must continue 
indefinitely.  
VIII. Conclusion 
In combatting corruption, FIFA should place continued 
emphasis on public transparency, which will provide a mechanism 
of public pressure to encourage good behavior, and consider 
amending the responsibilities of the existing FIFA governing 
bodies.  Doing so would allow for more stringent monitoring of 
FIFA and its member institutions for violations of FIFA rules and 
regulations and ensure adherence to the FIFA Code of Ethics.  
Moving forward, if FIFA reform efforts are to have a lasting impact 
on how FIFA leadership and individuals who work under the FIFA 
umbrella interact with one other, FIFA governance and middle 
management must focus on building an internal culture of 
compliance, integrity, and public transparency.  
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